Fisheries management

September 22, 2014 — October 6, 2024

economics
faster pussycat
game theory
incentive mechanisms
institutions

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Figure 1

In a former life, I studied fisheries management, and wrote an honours thesis on the Transferable quotas system. I do not have much to say on it these days, except that I wish to keep this fact memorialized, and also I think that Transferable quotas are an elegant case of mechanism design.

1 Transferable quotas

Transferable quotas: This is a system where the government sets a total allowable catch for a fishery, and then divides this up into individual quotas that can be traded. It is an elegant system; it looks like it makes fishers internalize the externalities of overfishing, and it can be shown to be efficient in a competitive equilibrium (Aslin, Connor, and Fisher 2001; Connor and Alden 2001; Connor 2004; Grafton et al. 2006).

2 References

Aslin, Connor, and Fisher. 2001. “Sharing in the Catch or Cashing in the Share? Social Impacts of Individual Transferable Quotas and the South East Fishery.”
Connor. 2004. “Individual Transferable Quota in Fisheries Management.”
Connor, and Alden. 2001. “Indicators of the Effectiveness of Quota Markets: The South East Trawl Fishery of Australia.” Marine and Freshwater Research.
Grafton, Arnason, Bjørndal, et al. 2006. “Incentive-Based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries.” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences.