Social justice games, colonial games
Collective action for mutually assured destruction
July 8, 2022 — June 23, 2022
communicating
cooperation
culture
economics
evolution
game theory
mind
wonk
Assumed audience:
Insurgents and conquerors alike
Placeholder for remarking particular types of coalition games.
I’ve heard enough people fulminating about the other side recently that I want to dissect the fulminating dynamics for my own satisfaction.
I would ideally present these strategies without judgment or moralizing, but simply to regard the dynamics we can expect with each and to introduce terminology so we can understand the pathologies that arise with each.
Elite capture (kinda).
1 Divide and conquer
Very popular in colonial conquest, e.g. British in India.
2 Unify and conquer
TODO
3 With multiple goods
Equivalently, with many different personal utilities.
4 Incoming
5 References
Bachrach, Elkind, Meir, et al. 2009. “The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games.” In Algorithmic Game Theory. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Bruner, and O’Connor. 2017. “Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration.” In Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration.
Cechlárová, and Romero-Medina. 2001. “Stability in Coalition Formation Games.” International Journal of Game Theory.
Demetriou. 2016. “Fighting Together: Civil Discourse and Agonistic Honor.” In Honor in the Modern World: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Honor and Obligation in Liberal Society: Problems and Prospects.
Greenberg. 1994. “Coalition Structures.” In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
Hales. 2005. “Change Your Tags Fast! – A Necessary Condition for Cooperation?” In Multi-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
———. 2006. “Choose Your Tribe! – Evolution at the Next Level in a Peer-to-Peer Network.” In Engineering Self-Organising Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
O’Connor. 2019. The Origins of Unfairness: Social Categories and Cultural Evolution.
———. 2022. “Why Natural Social Contracts Are Not Fair.”
Przepiorka, and Diekmann. 2021. “Parochial Cooperation and the Emergence of Signalling Norms.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
Ray. 2007. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation. The Lipsey Lectures.
Ray, and Vohra. 2015. “Coalition Formation.” In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
Weber. 1994. “Games in Coalitional Form.” In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
Yi. 1997. “Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities.” Games and Economic Behavior.